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The focus of trade policy has shifted in recent years from 
economy-wide reductions in tariffs and trade restrictions 
toward targeted interventions to facilitate trade and 
promote exports. Most of these latter interventions are 
based on the new mantra of “aid-for-trade” rather than 
on hard evidence on what works and what does not. On 
the one hand, rigorous impact-evaluation is needed to 
justify these interventions and to improve their design.  
On the other hand, rigorous evaluation is feasible because 
unlike traditional trade policy, these interventions tend 
to be targeted and so it is possible to construct treatment 
and control groups. When interventions are not targeted, 
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such as in the case of customs reforms, some techniques, 
such as randomized control trials, may not be feasible 
but meaningful evaluation may still be possible. Theis 
paper discusses examples of impact evaluations using a 
range of methods (experimental and non-experimental), 
highlighting the particular issues and caveats arising in 
a trade context, and the valuable lessons that are already 
being learned. The authors argue that systematically 
building impact evaluation into trade projects could 
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Trade policy has changed fundamentally since the days of structural adjustment and economy-
wide trade reforms. Partly in reaction to the uneven results of trade policy reforms, the focus has 
shifted  to  more  targeted  interventions  aimed  at  reducing  trade  costs  and  addressing  market 
failures that inhibit exports. Significant national resources and international assistance are now 
devoted to trade facilitation and export promotion, and the international development community 
has galvanized around a new ―aid-for-trade‖ (AfT) mantra as a means of helping low-income 
countries integrate into the global economy.  
The environment in which trade-related assistance is provided has also changed. In times of 
fiscal austerity, taxpayers increasingly question the justification for large aid flows and, at the 
very least, demand results and accountability.
2 The development community has struggled to 
respond to these demands because there is surprisingly little evidence  about what works and 
what doesn’t in the area of trade and industrial policies.  
An authoritative survey of trade and industrial policy recently acknowledged that there is hardly 
any  microeconomic  evidence  to  guide  specific  trade  interventions  (Harrison  and  Rodríguez-
Clare, 2010). There are several reasons for the disappointing pace at which such evidence has 
been  gathered.  Trade  policy  research  has  been  slow  to  respond  to  changing  needs.  Tariffs 
continue to occupy center stage in policy research, in spite of their declining importance as trade 
barriers, simply because they are easy to measure. The aid-for-trade community has in turn been 
slow to build a culture of rigorous evaluation. For instance, a review of 85 recent World Bank 
trade-related projects conducted by the authors revealed that only five of them included rigorous 
evaluation components. Worse, those few evaluations relied on crude before-after comparisons, 
which are known to be vulnerable to confounding influences.  The ―knowledge-market failures‖ 
identified  by  Ravallion  (2009)  have  also  inhibited  rigorous  evaluations  in  the  trade  context:  
demanders  of  knowledge  about  the  effectiveness  of  trade  interventions  have  inadequate 
information about the quality of any potential evaluation, especially because there are so few 
good examples;  project managers tend to have ―monopolistic‖ control over which projects get 
evaluated, at what cost and how;  and the benefits from the rigorous evaluation of a particular 
trade project  accrue in large part to other  future  projects which  do not  share in the cost of 
evaluating the project. 
Still, trade evaluation itself can benefit from the positive externalities generated by research in 
other areas. In fact, the tools for a serious evaluation of trade-related interventions are already 
                                                 
2 A recent poll featured by the Financial Times (Financial Times, July 12, 2010) showed that a majority of respondents in OECD 
countries considered defense and development aid as priority areas for spending cuts.  3 
 
there.  Originally  developed  in  the  agro-biological  and  then  the  medical  sciences,  impact 
evaluation (IE) methods have spread to the social sciences and are routinely employed in the 
areas of health and education. In essence, an impact evaluation compares the outcomes of entities 
— individuals or firms — that received support from a program or were directly impacted by a 
policy with the counterfactual outcome of those same entities had the program or policy not been 
in place. Because such counterfactual outcomes are not observable, they are approximated by the 
outcomes of a control group.  
IE  methods  have  provided  powerful  tools  in  other  fields  to  help  guide  policy  choices  and 
minimize  the  cost  of  interventions.  For  instance,  Banerjee  and  Duflo  (2008)  showed  how  a 
comparison of IE results established that, in order to raise school attendance rates among Kenyan 
children, a program to treat intestinal worms was twenty times more cost-effective than hiring 
teachers, suggesting a clear prioritization of actions.
3  
The recent creation by the World Bank of a separate impact evaluation unit as part of the 
Development Impact Evaluation Initiative (DIME) has helped spread IE methods to new areas of 
development research and practice.
4 For instance, World Bank researchers have led the way in 
analyzing the impact of business registration reform or bankruptcy reform (Klapper and Love, 
2010; Bruhn, 2011; Gine and Love, 2011). Researchers have also begun to use these methods to 
evaluate programs and policies in  the area of private sector development, where the treated 
"entities" are firms (see McKenzie, 2010 for a survey).  Similar evaluations could be used to 
guide trade interventions. 
The usual excuse for  not using IE methods in assessing the effectiveness of trade assistance is 
that the "clinical" nature of the treatment needed for a proper definition of treatment and control 
groups  is  absent  from  trade  policy.  This  was  perhaps  true  of  old-style  trade  policies  like 
structural adjustment or tariff reforms; but it is not true of the new trade interventions like export 
promotion. This paper intends to show that trade exceptionalism — the notion that trade-related 
interventions are inherently not amenable to IE — is, if anything, limited to traditional trade 
policies. More recent, focused trade-related interventions can be evaluated formally, provided 
that one is not wedded to a particular methodology such as randomized-control trials (RCTs). 
Although, as we will see, the range of application of RCTs is broader than one might think, other 
quasi-experimental methods are available and can shed light on what works and what does not. 
                                                 
3 This ratio was established by comparing the evaluation of a de-worming program by Miguel and Kremer (2004) with a separate 
evaluation of a program to reduce teacher-student ratios by Banerjee, Jacob, Kremer, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2005). Comparing 
impact estimates from separate impact evaluations is tricky since each has been established in a particular context with limited 
external validity (we will return to the issue later on in this paper). However, when the difference in cost effectiveness is as large 
as this one, the risk of getting the prioritization order wrong is reduced.  
4 Information on DIME can be obtained at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/ 
EXTDEVIMPEVAINI/0,,menuPK:3998281~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3998212,00.html. 4 
 
RCTs are only one of the possible approaches for rigorous impact evaluation. For instance, some 
countries implement regulatory reforms in staggered fashion starting in a small set of locations 
before extending them to all locations. The impact of such reforms can be rigorously evaluated 
by using locations where the reforms are introduced later as a control group for the locations 
where  reforms  are  introduced  earlier  and  using  a  difference-in-differences  estimation 
methodology  (see  Bruhn, 2011).  Similarly,  ex-post evaluation of programs  and  policies  is  a 
possible approach, provided that information is available both on which firms received support 
from a program or were directly impacted by a policy as well as on the entire (or a large portion 
of the) universe of firms. In these circumstances, it is possible to use propensity score matching 
combined  with  difference-in-differences  estimation  (see  e.g.  Tan,  2009;  Lopez-Acevedo  and 
Tinajero, 2010). 
These methods have already been applied in a number of recent studies and have produced 
interesting and unexpected results. Consider the following three examples:  
First, in an ex-post evaluation of export promotion programs in six Latin American countries 
using  rich  firm-level  datasets,  Volpe  (2011)  shows  that  these  programs  were  effective  in 
facilitating export expansion primarily along the extensive margin (i.e., through an increase in 
the number of products exported or in the number of export markets served) rather than along the 
intensive margin (an increase in exports of existing products to existing markets). He also shows 
that programs benefitted small and relatively inexperienced firms more than larger and already 
established exporters, and that bundled services providing support to firms throughout the export 
development process were more effective than isolated actions.  
Gourdon, Marchat, Sharma, and Vishwanath (2011) use similar ex-post evaluation methods to 
assess the impact of a World Bank-financed export promotion program in Tunisia — FAMEX — 
which provided a mixture of counseling and matching grants to new exporters.  Their findings 
suggest that export promotion has a large and significant effect on overall export growth: a 39% 
increase in the average annual growth rate of program beneficiaries relative to the control group 
over a four-year period. The effect of the program on the extensive margin of exports – in terms 
of products and destinations – is more subdued: about 5% higher growth for beneficiaries that is 
significant only for destinations. They also find a significant increase in employment growth, i.e., 
10%  more  for  program  beneficiaries  than  for  control  firms.  The  effect  on  export  growth  is 
stronger for firms that were initially only marginal exporters (exports represented less than 20% 
of turnover). Interestingly, their sample also includes services firms, for which the effect of 
export promotion is significantly larger than for manufacturing firms.  
Datt  and  Yang  (2011)  analyze  a  natural  experiment  in  which  the  Philippines  government 
suddenly reduced the minimum value threshold under which shipments were exempt from pre-
shipment inspections (PSI), closing a loophole that had encouraged importers to slice shipments 5 
 
in order to escape inspection. They show that the reform failed to curb under-invoicing and thus 
to raise duty collection as importers switched to an alternative loophole, namely, the use of an 
export-processing zone (EPZ). As this alternative loophole involved high fixed costs (setting up 
a presence in the EPZ), in the end the Philippine government was no better off while importers 
were worse off. The authors also discuss the effects of a related policy reform in Colombia 
where the government sought to remedy undervaluation of certain imports by mandating PSI on 
a subset of products. This, however, left open the loophole of misclassification of those products 
as similar products that did not require a PSI. Both cases illustrate the importance of careful, 
incentive-compatible reform design. 
This paper considers a detailed menu of trade-related interventions and discusses the challenges 
posed by their evaluation. In doing so, we discuss examples of impact evaluations using a range 
of methods (experimental and non-experimental) highlighting the particular issues and caveats 
arising in a trade context, and the valuable lessons that are already being learnt. We argue that 
systematically building impact evaluation into trade projects could lead to better policy design 
and to a more credible case for ―aid-for-trade.‖ The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 discusses the changing nature of trade policy while Section 3 reviews the available 
evidence on the impact of trade assistance. Section 4 considers trade-related interventions and 
their  evaluation.  Section  5  addresses  the  data  issues  crucial  to  impact  evaluation.  Section  6 
discusses the future challenges in IE of trade assistance. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The changing nature of trade policy and trade assistance 
Most  developing  countries  have  moved  beyond  the  first  generation  of  trade  reforms,  which 
involved across-the-board cuts in tariffs and the elimination of import quotas. Tariffs have fallen 
substantially  over  the  last  20  years.  The  simple  average  applied  tariff  of  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO) members on all goods was 5.8 percent in 2008 (WTO, 2009), and the 
developing country average is down to around 10 percent compared to 30 percent in 1990.  
Recourse to quantitative restrictions has also substantially declined. One reason is the narrower 
interpretation of the balance-of-payments exception in the WTO and the stricter enforcement of 
the conditions under which it can be invoked. Countries like India have been forced to phase out 
numerous quotas that had been maintained for a long time, ostensibly to address balance of 
payments difficulties. Another reason is the tighter interpretation following the Uruguay Round 
Agreement  of  the  national  treatment  provision  in  the  WTO,  which  precludes  local-content 
requirements that many developing countries had favored and other members had tolerated. 
With this decline in traditional barriers to market access, supply-side constraints are seen as the 
main  obstacle  that  developing  countries  face  in  taking  advantage  of  new  opportunities  in 6 
 
international markets. Therefore, trade interventions are becoming more targeted, focusing either 
on (a) the trade facilitation agenda, involving, for example, customs reforms and infrastructure 
— e.g. port — improvements and/or (b) the trade competitiveness agenda, consisting of pro-
active industrial policies, involving productive capacity building, EPZs, or export promotion. In 
designing such trade interventions, developing countries need policy advice, particularly more 
evidence-based advice. They need to know which interventions work and which do not, in which 
sectors, in which sequence, and which ones are most cost-effective. 
The World Bank too has shifted emphasis in its trade assistance from broad trade liberalization 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s to more targeted interventions to reduce the costs of trade and to 
equip producers to export since the early 2000s. The declaration of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) ministers in Hong Kong SAR, China in 2005 and the first Global Aid for Trade Review 
in Geneva in 2007 gave an impetus to the expansion of aid for trade to help developing countries 
build their supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure.  
The  World  Bank  responded  by  expanding  its  commitments  on  trade  competitiveness,  trade 
facilitation, and infrastructure, and is now a leading contributor to aid for trade. As shown by 
Figure 1, recent commitments by the World Bank are substantial and growing: concessional 
trade-related  lending  (as  per  OECD/WTO  definition)  to  low-income  countries  grew  from 
US$3.18 billion annually in 2002–2005 to an average of US$4.84 billion in 2007–2008, while 
non-concessional  trade-related  lending  to  middle  income  countries  increased  from  US$4.16 
billion  in  2002–2005  to  US$9.8  billion  in  2007-2008  (World  Bank,  2011).
5  Since 2001 the 
World Bank approved 437 trade -related lending projects in 90 countries and 53 trade -related 
lending operations in 10 regional groups, with Africa and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
accounting for most of the operations (World Bank, 2011). 
Figure 1 
World Bank aid-for-trade commitments 2002–2010 
                                                 
5 The numbers presented in the figure are based on the OECD/WTO definition of aid-for-trade. The sectors that fall under this 
definition  are  (1)  for  IBRD/IDA  -  agriculture,  fishing  and  forestry;  information  and  communication;  energy  and  mining; 
transportation; and industry and trade; (2) for IFC - agriculture and forestry; information; oil, gas and mining; chemical; utilities; 
transportation and warehousing; construction and real estate; food and beverages; nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing; 
primary metals; pulp and paper; textiles, apparel and leather; plastics and rubber; industrial and consumer products; wholesale 
and retail trade; professional, scientific and technical services; and accommodation and tourism services. 7 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank Business Warehouse website. 
 
Trade facilitation-related infrastructure is the largest single component of World Bank trade-
related  investments  in  developing  countries,  while  the  rest  consist  mostly  of  improving 
competitiveness. Figure 2 shows the distribution of World Bank commitments on aid for trade as 
of fiscal year 2008 while  Table  1  details  the types  of interventions falling  under  the  "trade 
competitiveness" and the "trade facilitation" agendas. 
Figure 2  
World Bank Group trade portfolio 2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank Business Warehouse website. 
Given the increase in aid for trade, donors and recipients would like to see evidence that this new 
type of assistance will be more effective than past aid efforts. These concerns are especially 
strong in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, when pressures to reduce fiscal deficits and 
debt  are weakening political support for foreign assistance. In  fact,  a recent  opinion poll in 
OECD countries revealed that a large majority of the public favored cuts in defense and aid 
spending rather than in other categories of expenditure.
6  
 Table 1   
Focused trade interventions 
Trade competitiveness (including trade finance)  Trade facilitation and logistics 
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  Export promotion/diversification 
  Support to producer/exporter organizations 
  Quality testing and export certification 
  Technology upgrading and support services 
  Strengthening policy/regulatory framework 
  Export credit insurance 
  Export credit guarantee 
  Line of credit 
  Support for financial institutions 
   Customs reform 
   Ports/airports rehabilitation 
   Railway privatization/rehabilitation 
   Roads construction/rehabilitation 
 
3. Existing methods of evaluating trade interventions 
In this section, we review three kinds of existing evaluation efforts. The first involves broad 
and—to this day—largely inconclusive assessments of aid for trade and its impact. The second 
examines the effect of national trade interventions, such as export promotion activities, but still 
at a highly aggregate level, considering mostly aggregate exports as outcomes; this literature 
provides some support for certain types of focused interventions. The third set of efforts involves 
assessments  by  the  World  Bank  of  its  own  trade-related  projects.  While  this  last  set  are  in 
principle as focused as the interventions themselves, they have for the most part not been based 
on the collection or analysis of any hard evidence on impact.  
Before we discuss some of the results emerging from each strand of evaluation efforts, it is worth 
noting that cross-country regressions, on which the first two strands rely heavily, have strengths 
of their own, but also limitations that are sufficiently serious to have prompted a growing number 
of  development  scholars  to  turn  to  different  methodologies  if  not  an  altogether  different 
paradigm. On the positive side, cross-country regressions—based on either cross-sections stricto 
sensu or on multi-period panels—provide general average estimates of the effects of a policy or 
program that are not reflections of a specific context. They also pick up the entire effect of the 
policy  or  program,  including  externalities  and  general-equilibrium  feedbacks.  Both  of  these 
strengths are particularly relevant in comparison with micro-level impact evaluations, as we will 
see later on. 
On the  negative side, like the earlier literature on the effect of trade reforms,  cross-country 
regressions  evaluating  the  effect  of  aid  or  specific  trade  interventions  tend  to  suffer  from 
problems of weak identification and attribution.
7 Neither policies nor aid flows can be taken as 
exogenous to the performance outcome s  they are supposed to affect, and no instrumental -
                                                 
7 For a thorough discussion of the trade-off between internal and external validity, see for instance Rodrik (2008) and references 
therein. 9 
 
variable  strategy,  however  clever,  has  dispelled  doubts  about  reverse  causation  or  omitted-
variable bias, both likely to be present at the level of aggregation at which these studies are cast. 
Impact evaluations, for all their own limitations, are less vulnerable to these identification issues, 
because  they  rely,  for  identification,  on  outcome  differences  between  treatment  and  control 
groups in the same context, instead of variations in policy choices or aid flows across countries. 
3.1 Evaluating aid for trade  
The literature on the impact of AfT is fairly limited, in part because AfT projects are not always 
distinguishable from other aid projects. As in the rest of the aid effectiveness literature, the 
results are ambiguous (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). Regarding the cross-country allocation of 
AfT,  Gamberoni  and  Newfarmer  (2009)  find  that,  after  controlling  for  absorption  capacity 
(related, for example, to governance), more AfT is directed towards countries with a higher 
demand for AFT as measured by indicators of ―underperformance‖ in trade.
8  
On impact, one strand of the literature explores whether AfT positively affects exports from the 
donor country to the recipient country given that, up to the early 1990s, over half of all bilateral 
aid was at least partially tied to donor exports. Using a gravity equation, Wagner (2003) shows 
that this form of trade was indeed boosted; but Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd (2004), using a 
gravity  equation  in  first  differences  for  a  panel  of  four  European  donors  and  26  African 
recipients, found an unstable and insignificant impact of aid on exports from donor to recipient. 
Recently, Nelson and Juhasz Silva (2008) use a more conventional gravity equation including 
bilateral  aid  flows  as  a  regressor  (instrumented  by  their  one-year  lagged  value),  and  find  a 
significant although small impact on trade flows from donor to recipient. 
From a development perspective, only a few of the recent studies focus on the more relevant 
question of whether aid raises the export capacity of recipient countries. Cali and te Velde (2011) 
regress trading costs and the value of exports on lagged AfT disbursements and control variables, 
using data from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System that separately identifies aid to trade 
facilitation and infrastructure from aid to productive capacity.
9 Using a large panel of developing 
countries, the authors address the possibility of endogeneity and  measurement errors in AfT 
flows by instrumenting those with the Freedom House’s index of civil liberties. The message that 
emerges  across  their  various  specifications  is  that  aid  to  trade  facilitation  and  infrastructure 
seems to have a significant effect in reducing trade costs and in increasing export values, while 
                                                 
8 Underperformance in trade is captured by multiple indicators. Countries that underperform in trade can be those in the lower 
two quintiles of performance measured along five dimensions: (a) those experiencing relatively slow growth of exports of goods 
and services, (b) those losing global market share, (c) those suffering deterioration in competitiveness in existing markets, (d) 
those exporting slow-growing products or to slow-growing markets, and/or (e) those over-reliant on only a few exports. Also, 
countries that underperform in trade are those that under-trade with bilateral partners, controlling for market size and distance, 
those with low levels scores on the World Bank logistics performance index for transport or for customs, and on an indicator of 
peak tariffs.  
9 Trading costs are measured by the trading across borders indicators of the Doing Business database. 10 
 
aid to productive capacity is insignificant. When considering sectorally targeted aid, the authors 
again  find  that  aid  to  infrastructure  has  a  significant  impact  on  export  values,  but  aid  to 
productive  capacity  does  not,  controlling  for  country-sector  fixed  effects  that  account  for 
comparative advantage differences.  
Brenton and von Uexkull (2009) examine the response of product-level exports from developing 
countries  to  product-level  export-development  aid,  combining  mirrored  product-level  (HS4) 
export data with export-development aid data from the German cooperation agency GTZ and 
from the OECD/WTO Trade Capacity Building Database for 48 developing countries. Using a 
matching  difference-in-differences  (DID)  approach  (discussed  in  section  4)  they  show 
insignificant  effects  of  contemporaneous  and  lagged  aid  on  product-level  exports  after 
controlling  for  lagged  exports,  and  country  and  year-product  fixed  effects,  and  eliminating 
outliers.
10  However, the authors do show strong positive effects in a simple comparison of 
product-level exports before and after receiving export development aid. This finding  suggests 
an important attribution problem — namely, export growth may not be due to the aid received 
but instead may reflect the fact that aid targets sectors with promising prospects. The authors go 
on to argue that, in evaluating the impact of technical assistance for exports, it is essential to 
identify what would have happened in the absence of the policy intervention. This is a primary 
concern in this paper. 
As the literature stands, it is fair to say that the effect of AfT on the export performance of 
beneficiary  countries  has  not  been  established  on  the  basis  of  aggregate  numbers.  Ferro, 
Portugal-Perez, and Wilson (2011) advance the analysis of the effectiveness of AfT revisiting the 
data from OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. The authors exploit the differential intensities of 
service  use  across  manufacturing  sectors  (based  on  input-output  tables  from  the  U.S.  and 
Argentina) to evaluate the impact of aid for trade flows directed at five services sectors  — 
transport, communications, energy, banking/financial services, and business services — on the 
exports  of  downstream  manufacturing  sectors  in  106  aid-recipient  countries  over  the  period 
1990–2008.  Their  identification  strategy  aims  at  circumventing  reverse  causality  problems 
common in the AfT literature; and their results show that aid flows directed at the energy and 
banking sectors have a significant positive impact on downstream manufacturing exports.  
3.2 Evaluating national trade interventions 
A  few  recent  cross-country  studies  suggest  a  positive  impact  of  certain  types  of  trade 
interventions,  regardless  of  whether  they  are  financed  by  donors  or  domestic  government 
budgets.  On  export  promotion,  Lederman,  Olarreaga,  and  Payton  (2010)  examine  the 
                                                 
10 Their matching approach pairs each treatment country that receives export development aid for a given product i to the country 
that is more similar to it in terms of its likelihood to export product i, where this likelihood is estimated based on observable 
country characteristics such as the level of development, factor endowments, and climate conditions. 11 
 
effectiveness of export promotion agencies (EPAs) based on a rich survey of EPAs across 88 
developed and developing countries. The goals of EPAs are to help exporters understand and 
find markets for their products and services and can be divided into four categories: (a) country 
image building (advertising, promotional events, but also advocacy); (b) export support services 
(exporter  training,  technical  assistance,  capacity  building,  including  regulatory  compliance, 
information on trade finance, logistics, customs, packaging, pricing); (c) marketing (trade fairs, 
exporter and importer missions, follow-up services offered by representatives abroad); and (d) 
market research and publications (general, sector, and firm-level information, such as market 
surveys,  on-line  information  on  export  markets,  publications  encouraging  firms  to  export, 
importer and exporter contact databases) (Lederman et al. [2010], pp. 257–258). For 21 of the 73 
developing  countries  surveyed,  the  authors  find  that  EPAs  receive  budgetary  support  from 
multilateral  donors  such  as  the  World  Bank.  The  authors  estimate  the  effect  of  EPAs’ 
expenditures per capita on overall exports per capita at the country level, accounting for selection 
bias in survey responses and for potential reverse causality. Their main conclusion is that, on 
average, EPAs have a significant positive effect on exports. Their estimates also point to the 
importance of EPAs’ services for overcoming foreign trade barriers and solving asymmetric 
information  problems  associated  with  exports  of  differentiated  goods.  In  addition,  they  find 
evidence of strong diminishing returns, suggesting that small is beautiful as far as EPAs are 
concerned.  However,  the  authors  acknowledge  that  cross-country  regressions  cannot  fully 
capture  the heterogeneity  of  policy  environments  and  institutional  structures  in  which  EPAs 
operate; hence, more detailed studies or project-type analyses are needed to provide specific 
policy advice.  
On trade facilitation, Helble, Mann, and Wilson (2009) examine the  responsiveness of trade 
flows to various types of aid for trade — linked to reform of trade policy and regulation, trade 
development  (productive  capacity  building),  and  economic  infrastructure  —  using  a  gravity 
equation framework covering 167 importers (reporters) and 172 exporters (partners) during the 
1990–2005 period. Their results indicate that relatively small amounts of aid targeted at trade 
policy and regulatory reform have a greater impact with respect to increased trade flows than aid 
for  broad  trade  development  assistance  or  infrastructure.  Several  recent  papers  point  to  the 
importance of internal barriers related to infrastructure and institutions — including logistics 
performance — as obstacles to developing countries’ ability to trade and the volume of trade 
(e.g., Djankov, Freund, and Pham, 2010; Francois and Manchin, 2007; Freund and Rocha, 2011; 
Hoekman and Nicita, 2008; Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2010). More specific studies highlight 
the importance of reducing marketing, transport, and other intermediary costs in agricultural 
supply chains (Balat, Brambilla, and Porto, 2009; Diop, Brenton, and Asarkaya, 2005). Although 12 
 
these studies point out the relevance of increased donor assistance to trade facilitation, they do 
not help delineate the policies and programs that would be most effective in cutting trade costs.
11 
In their recent authoritative survey of the state-of-the-art literature on industrial policy, Harrison 
and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) conclude that empirical evidence on the effectiveness of various 
forms of industrial policy is scarce.  The authors look at the case of East Asian countries where 
industrial policies based on use of production subsidies, subsidized credit, fiscal incentives, and 
trade protection to foster particular sectors. From this, they claim that the available evidence does 
not answer the most important question: what was the effect of these industrial policies relative 
to the counterfactual situation where such intervention was absent.
12 In sum, there are no studies 
that  can  credibly  credit  industrial  policies  with  bringing  about  East  Asia’s  successful 
industrialization experience. But the authors do make a tentative argument that industrial policies 
played a role in some countries' growth experiences based on two complementary ideas. First, 
the composition of a country’s export basket — a tilt towards manufacturing or skill-intensive 
goods rather than primary products or raw materials — seems to matter for its long-run growth. 
Second,  China’s  export  basket  in  1992  was  much  more  sophisticated  than  what  would  be 
expected given the country’s per capita GDP and that could only be the outcome of its industrial 
policies (Rodrik, 2006).
13  
Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare’s literature survey concludes with an advocacy statement on the 
type  of  national  trade-related  assistance  likely  to  be  most  successful:  that  which  increases 
exposure to trade (such as export promotion) in contrast to that which limits trade (such as tariffs 
or domestic content requirements).
14 The authors also make a statement on the specifics of policy 
design, where they envision an increasing role for ―soft‖ industrial policies that deal directly with 
coordination problems, such as those that keep productivity low in existing or emerging sectors. 
These  policies  include  programs  ―to  help  particular  clusters  by  increasing  supply  of  skilled 
workers,  encouraging  technology  adoption,  and  improving  regulation  and  infrastructure‖ 
(Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare [2010] p. 4112).
15 The problem with this statement is that it has a 
―rabbit-out-of-the-hat‖ aspect because the survey includes little supporting evidence. In fact, the 
absence of evidence for the policy recommendations the survey offers is a reason for our effort to 
initiate new research on these issues.  
                                                 
11 For example, Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2010) estimate the impact of aggregate indicators of "soft" and "hard" infrastructure 
on the export performance of 101 developing countries over the 2004–2007 period. Their estimates show that trade facilitation 
reforms - particularly investment in physical infrastructure and regulatory reform to improve the business environment - improve 
significantly  export  performance.  Moreover,  they  show  that  the  marginal  effect  of  infrastructure  improvements  on  exports 
appears to be decreasing with per capita income. 
12 One empirical approach that has been followed in some studies is to examine whether the sectors that received most support 
from industrial policies are those that have grown most rapidly; but that approach does not address the counterfactual issue. 
13 This finding was based on the measure of sophistication of a country’s exports basket developed by Hausman, Hwang, and 
Rodrik (2007) constructed using the level of GDP per capita associated with exports of different goods worldwide. 
14 The authors make this statement based on extensive cross-country and cross-sector evidence on trade and growth. 
15 The authors argue that an advantage of such ―soft‖ industrial policies is that they are generally compatible with the multilateral 
and bilateral trade agreements that developing countries have entered into in the last decades. 13 
 
3.3 Evaluating World Bank trade programs 
In principle, World Bank trade-related projects should be a key source of evidence on the effects 
of specific trade interventions, which could become the basis for further evidence-based policy 
advice. In practice, though, this is rarely the case. Few interventions have undergone rigorous 
impact evaluation. 
An evaluation of World Bank financed trade-related assistance during the 1987–2004 period 
conducted  by  the  Independent  Evaluation  Group  (IEG)  concluded  that  it  helped  countries 
liberalize their trade regimes — average tariffs fell and coverage of nontariff barriers diminished 
— with positive effects on economic growth (IEG, 2006). However, the evaluation also argued 
that assistance fell short of generating a strong export supply response. Many client countries, 
especially in Africa, could not diversify their exports and remained vulnerable to commodity 
price shocks.  
IEG (2006) also discusses the performance ratings of World Bank aid-for-trade projects, which 
give a sense of their effectiveness in achieving their stated goals. The report shows that trade-
related adjustment loans until 2004 performed better than other adjustment loans; whereas trade-
related investment loans performed worse than other investment loans of the World Bank.
16 
Moreover, according to the same evaluation, assistance on trade logistics — ports, customs, and 
trade finance — and export incentives had a mixed record, though one that improved over time.  
A review of the IEG ratings of recent investment projects and programs on trade promotion, 
completed as of 2007 (World Bank, 2009), indicates that more than 85 percent were rated as 
having moderately satisfactory, satisfactory, or highly satisfactory outcomes, which was higher 
than for projects in other areas.
17 Aid-for-trade projects also had higher estimated economic rates 
of return (around 32%) than other non-trade related projects (around 23.7%).
18  
While providing valuable insights, the IEG evaluations of trade assistance offer limited evidence 
to support focused trade interventions. Moreover, the eval uation does not cover much of the 
recent increase in AfT assistance for export promotion and trade facilitation. 
                                                 
16 Projects that focused primarily on trade liberalization achieved the best performance ratings whereas those related to private 
financing (such as export finance guarantees and export reinsurance) were the least successful. The superior performance of 
projects  focusing  on  trade  liberalization  is  not  surprising  as  it  reflects  the  relative  legislative  ease  of  putting  in  place  the 
associated actions (e.g., reform of the tariff regime). In contrast, projects that focused on thematic areas related to key supply-side 
constraints that impose greater demands on institutional and administrative capacity, such as trade financing, are more difficult to 
implement.  
17 IEG assesses the performance of roughly one World Bank project out of four (about 70 projects a year) measuring outcomes 
against the original objectives, sustainability of results, and institutional development impact. 
18  An economic rate of return is the discounted interest rate that would keep an agent indifferent between the choice of 
undertaking or not undertaking the project. 14 
 
In search of evidence on the impact of such trade interventions, we conducted a thorough review 
of  the  evaluation  methods  for  85  World  Bank  trade-related  investment  lending  projects 
undertaken during the 1995–2005 period. The source of data was the World Bank’s Operations 
portal website and in particular the Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) and the Implementation 
Completion Reports (ICRs).
19 The evaluation methods used can be classified into five distinct 
categories:  (a)  only  economic  or  financial  internal  rates  of  return,  net  present  value  or 
effectiveness calculations; (b) beneficiary surveys and stakeholder workshops; (c) both a and b, 
(d)  both a and b, with a comparison of beneficiaries to a control group; and (e) no formal 
evaluation methods used.
20 One key aspect to note is that the implementation of a beneficiary 
survey does not guarantee that a rigorous impact evaluation can be conducted since in most cases 
the survey covers only outcomes pertaining to beneficiaries of the project, and no control group 
is covered (more details on these methods will be provided in section 4).  
Figure 3 shows that evaluation using only economic or financia l rates of return was the most 
commonly used method for the trade-related projects, while 10 percent of the projects involved 
no formal evaluation method.
21 Included in the latter category is a trade competitiveness project 
that described the impact of the  project in purely subjective terms: ―While the impact on the 
firms assisted had not yet been determined, a visit to two beneficiaries by a supervision mission 
confirmed that there had been an impressive impact on the firms' quality of products and skills.‖ 
Another example of the latter is a trade competitiveness project where the achievement of the 
overall goal was measured in terms of the higher average annual growth rate of exports during 
the project duration and increases in exports' share of GDP compared with the initial year of the 
project.  
Figure 3  
Evaluation of World Bank trade-related projects 1995–2005 
                                                 
19 We thank Vivian Agbhega for compiling the data for this review. The selection of trade-related projects followed the criteria 
used by Steven Gunawan in an unpublished study of "Monitoring and Evaluation Lessons of Trade Projects" that served as 
background work for the 2011 World Bank Trade Strategy. The projects were filtered from the World Bank’s Operations portal 
website according to the theme ―Trade and Integration," and falling within the following criteria: i) approved only after 1995 due 
to obsolescence; ii) IBRD/IDA-funded; and iii) closed. A total of 321 projects were filtered, out of which 144 were development 
policy loans and 177 were investment loans, and 30 investment lending projects had to be dropped since they lacked ICRs. A 
final set of 85 investment lending projects was obtained after excluding projects that did not have any trade components. The 
main documents used to extract information on the projects were PADs and ICRs. For each project we collected information on 
the types of intervention, the types of outputs and outcomes achieved, the evaluation methods employed, and the evidence or 
proof of causation of the impact of the project.  
20 A beneficiary survey consists of a formal survey of the entities that received assistance from the project, whereas a stakeholder 
workshop is a more informal way to collect information on the various entities affected by the project. 
21  Our analysis of project ICRs did reveal, however, that the use of these methods is often handicapped by difficulty in 
quantifying some of the costs and benefits of the project. Some project ICRs explicitly say that  certain benefits are not 
incorporated in net present value calculations due to their complexity. 15 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank Operations portal website. 
To  be  fair,  task  managers  of  trade-related  projects  are  often  candid  about  their  project’s 
achievements, writing in the ICR that observable results (particularly those relating to aggregate 
outcomes such as total exports) are not entirely the result of the program alone but rather the 
result of the work and resources of different institutions and sectors. The most striking fact in 
Figure 3 is that only 6 percent of projects (5 out of 85 projects) included a rigorous impact 
evaluation, involving a proper comparison of the outcomes of project beneficiaries with those of 
a control group. But even in such cases, the impact evaluation method raised certain issues, 
which we will discuss in the next section. 
A clarification should be made at this point concerning the link between evaluation methods of 
projects and the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework.
22 M&E is an important part of 
the design and implemen tation of World Bank lending projects and is the reason why, as 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, we would expect to obtain evidence on the effects of 
certain types of trade interventions from project -level analysis. M&E is based on performance 
indicators capturing outputs, outcomes, and impact of a project (discussed in ICRs).  
These categories of performance indicators are thought to be related according to the scheme 
shown in  Figure  4.  The scheme makes clear the distinction between considering outputs in 
general, and going one step further and also considering outcomes and the impact attributable to 
the project per se. One common concern with  the M&E framework for World Bank projects is 
that it often focuses on the monitoring part and not enough on the evaluation part.  For example, 
most projects include exports as impact indicators but do not include a proper impact evaluation 
strategy that allows for attribution to the project of an increase in exports. 
Figure 4  
From inputs to impact 
                                                 
22 This discussion draws heavily on the aforementioned unpublished study by Steven Gunawan. 
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In addition to World Bank investment lending projects, the World Bank also produces a large 
amount of analytical work — economic and sector work (ESW) — where one could expect to 
find evidence that supports certain trade interventions. The key trade-related analytical pieces — 
diagnostic trade integration studies (DTIS) — do highlight the high costs of producing goods and 
services for export, and for delivering them to foreign markets, as being the major barriers to 
trade integration in less developed countries, and point to infrastructure as the most pressing 
constraint. But they do not inform the development community about which interventions work 
and which do not, and which interventions are most cost-effective. 
4. Impact evaluation of trade interventions 
The  key  problem  that  IE  addresses  is  attribution  —  making  sure  that  observed  changes  in 
outcome variables are caused by the program or policy under evaluation and not by outside 
influences. Many outside influences can confound the identification of a program or policy’s 
impact. For instance, an export promotion scheme put in place in 2007 would see its positive 
impact confounded by the negative impact of the global crisis of 2008–2009; a simple before-
after comparison of outcomes would likely suggest a negative impact of the program.  
In order to filter out these influences, one would want to know how beneficiary firms would have 
performed  in  the  absence  of  the  program  (presumably  worse).  But  the  data  needed  for  this 
counterfactual does not exist, because firms cannot be both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries at 
the same time. This missing data problem is solved by using as a counterfactual the performance 
of other firms that did not benefit from the program. By analogy with first agro-biological and 
then medical sciences, where IE methods originate, beneficiaries are called the treatment group 
and non-beneficiaries the control group.
23 
                                                 
23 A pedagogical reference to IE techniques can be found in Khandker, Koolwal and Samad (2010), which contains analytical 
guidance as well as case studies and Stata do-files. A formal treatment can be found in Ravallion (2008), Blundell and Costa Dias 
(2009), and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 17 
 
The central idea of IE is best illustrated by a widely-used technique called double-differences or 
difference-in-differences. Under that technique, the effect of a program is assessed by comparing 
the performance of beneficiary firms before and after the treatment (first-difference), and then 
benchmarking that difference by comparing it to the difference in performance over the same 
period of non-beneficiary firms (difference-in-differences).
24 In our earlier example of an export 
promotion scheme put in place just before the onset of the crisis, its confounding effect would be 
captured (and thus filtered out) by the decrease in the performance of non -beneficiary firms 
during the program period. The program’s impact would then be measured by how much less 
badly beneficiary firms performed than non-beneficiary ones.  
As  noted  earlier,  IE  design  relies  on  less-than-universal  coverage,  which  provides  a  first 
categorization of programs into targeted and non-targeted ones. Another useful distinction is 
whether an evaluation is built into program design. In what follows, we consider each of the 
cases defined in Table 2 in the trade context, and discuss to what extent IE methods can be 
applied to them. Anticipating our conclusions, our basic argument is that the scope for IE in trade 
assistance projects is broader than might appear at first, provided that one is not wedded to a 
particular methodology (randomized control trials for instance).  
Table 2  
Boundaries of impact evaluation 
 
Notes:  RCT:  Randomized  control  trial;  Quasi-experimental  methods  are  matching,  difference-in-differences,  instrumental 
variables, or regression discontinuity design. 
                                                 
24 This difference in performance is not a ceteris paribus effect: it picks up both direct program effects and induced behavioral 
changes, which may work to either reinforce or weaken the program’s direct effect. For instance, a program combining matching 
grants with technical assistance targeted at particular operations within the firm can trigger broader management improvements (a 
reinforcing  influence)  or  partial  waste  of  program  money  through  management  slack  (a  mitigating  influence).  See  Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kremer (2008) for a discussion. 
Evaluation built into program design
Evaluation not built into program 
design
Targeted (typically trade competitiveness- 
related e.g., matching grants for 
producers for technology upgrading or 
export business plans; export credit 
guarantees for producers)
RCT is feasible; Quasi-experimental 
methods are a possible alternative
RCT is infeasible; Quasi-experimental 
methods are feasible
Non-targeted (typically trade facilitation-
related: e.g., customs reform, port 
improvements; but also some trade 
competitiveness -related:  support for 
producer organizations or other 
institutional reforms)
RCT is typically infeasible; Quasi-
experimental methods are more 
appropriate; Some methods of targeting 
can be introduced (phase-in, staggered 
implementation)
All IE methods are difficult; before-
after comparisons may be only 
alternative18 
 
4.1 Targeted interventions  
Targeted trade interventions include ―clinical‖ trade competitiveness programs such as export 
promotion  schemes  through  matching  grants  for  supporting  export  business  plans,  through 
export-credit guarantees, or through firm-level technical assistance for technology upgrading, for 
acquisition of international quality certifications or to meet other product standards. The key 
feature of these interventions is that the programs are assigned exclusively to certain units, often 
firms. Because these interventions operate at the level of the firm, non-assisted firms can in 
principle serve as the control group.  
4.1.1 Randomized-control trials 
In targeted interventions, when evaluation is built into program design, a randomized-control 
trial (RCT), sometimes called the ―gold standard‖ of IE, tends to be viewed as the best option, 
though this can be questioned as discussed below. It consists of drawing beneficiaries at random 
from  a  large  pool  of  firms.  By  the  law  of  large  numbers,  the  average  characteristics  of 
beneficiaries will be the same as those of non-beneficiaries. Were this condition not met, there 
would be a selection bias; that is, the program’s impact would be confounded not by outside 
factors, as before, but by differences in individual characteristics.
25 Random assignment to the 
program ensures that the ―unconfoundedness assumption‖ is verified which is key to identify the 
average treatment effect (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
Despite its analytical appeal, randomization must confront other difficulties, in general and in the 
context of trade-related assistance in particular. In terms of practical feasibility, randomization 
can be a hard sell with client governments for ethical or political reasons. Governments may be 
reluctant to extend assistance only to a subset of  agents when all need it, and any de facto 
discrimination may be politically costly.   
Randomization does allow for flexibility, which may help make it acceptable. First, it does not 
need to cover all individuals. For instance, a program can use standard selection methods to 
determine  eligibility,  and  introduce  randomization  among  either  all  eligible  firms  or  only 
―marginal‖ ones. That is, very strong candidates can be taken in, very weak ones left out, and 
only those in the middle subject to randomization.
26 Lotteries are somehow more appealing than 
blind randomization because they avoid the impression that something is hidden. At a more basic 
level, in the presence of rationed resources to fund  a  policy intervention,  the advantage of 
randomization is that it constitutes the fairest solution to rationing (Ravallion, 2008). 
                                                 
25 Put differently, the probability of getting treatment, conditional on the individual’s characteristics, needs to be independent of 
the outcome. 
26 We are grateful to David McKenzie for pointing this out to us. 19 
 
Duflo, Glennersten, and Kremer (2008) note that the spread of RCTs in health, education, and 
poverty  programs  owes  much  to  the  collaboration  with  NGOs,  as  collaboration  with  local 
authorities is still relatively rare. NGOs are much less involved in trade-related programs than in 
other programs, so the scope for RCTs may be inherently less, at least as long as the evaluation 
culture remains rare in public policy. Atkin and Khandelwal (2011) discuss how carrying out an 
RCT within the context of international trade depends crucially on finding a suitable local project 
partner who can provide the export promoting services to producers, and on convincing that 
project partner of the feasibility and value of the randomization procedure. However it should 
also be noted that working with NGOs generally limits the size and scope of the intervention and 
the  impact  of  the  program  could  differ  if  it  is  scaled  up  and  implemented  without  NGO 
collaboration (Ravallion, 2008). 
Atkin and Khandelwal (2011) describe an ongoing project for an RCT to assist microenterprises 
in the handloom weaving sector in Akhmeem, Upper Egypt to enter into export markets. The 
project’s objective is to link those microenterprises to foreign buyers in the U.S. through the 
provision of three kinds of services. The first consists of putting Egyptian producers in contact 
with design consultants to develop patterns that can appeal to the tastes of U.S. consumers; the 
second is marketing assistance with U.S. buyers; and the third is general business training. The 
project’s  impact-evaluation  design  is  simple:  after  drawing  up  a  list  of  potentially  viable 
producers/exporters  in  the  sector  and  region,  a  random  group  of  them  will  be  given  the 
opportunity to export to the U.S. market with the help of the three services listed above. The data 
on  both  outcomes  (export  performance)  and  covariates  (producer  characteristics)  will  be 
generated through surveys conducted as part of the IE. A baseline survey will collect information 
on all viable exporters — both those that will benefit from this intervention as well as those not 
approached before the services are provided. Another survey will be conducted long enough after 
the intervention in order for the effects to be tangible.  
The  World  Bank  is  considering  implementing  RCTs  in  some  of  its  own  projects  as  well, 
although plans at this stage are preliminary. Candidate projects include a customs border post 
modernization project at the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, 
where petty traders on foot, mostly women, are regularly exposed to corruption and harassment. 
The project would involve some of the women’s associations (with group randomization) to 
designate customs brokers acting as shields between women and predatory customs officers. 
Another project involves the facilitation of payments for small cross-border transactions through 
branchless  banking  near  the  Cameroon-Chad  border.  Currently,  all  payments  for  such 
transactions are made in cash, which hampers trade. At the very least, the project would involve 
a natural experiment if branchless banking is allowed for traders on one side of the border but 
not on the other; in addition, the design may involve, in a pilot phase, selected access to non-cash 
payments for a randomly chosen treatment group. 20 
 
One of the reasons why RCT is a preferred design for such experiments is that randomization 
does away with the need for complex econometric techniques to control for selection in non-
experimental settings. However, RCT is no silver bullet in small sample environments, as it 
relies  on the  law of large  numbers  to  ensure that expected  untreated outcomes  are equal in 
treatment  and  control  groups.  In  low-income  countries,  interventions  sometimes  target  very 
small numbers of firms (McKenzie, 2011b).
27 For instance, the Pesticides Initiative Program 
(PIP), an E.U. technical-assistance program designed to help fruit and vegetable producers cope 
with E.U. standards, covers less than a few dozen firms in some African countries (Jaud and 
Cadot,  2011).  Randomization  is  not  an  option  in  such  environments.  Quasi -experimental 
methods may not do very well either ; but if a  cross-country sample is available with enough 
observations, econometrics may offer some scope to control for cross -country heterogeneity.
28 
We will return to the small sample issue in the context of non-targeted interventions in section 
4.2 when referring to the Cameroon customs project described in Cantens, Raballand, Bilangna, 
and Djeuwo (2011).  
 
An intrinsic limitation of RCTs in the trade  and other economic areas is that the study subjects 
are active economic agents who consciously choose the ir responses as opposed to  the medical 
sciences where passive entities (e.g., cancer cells) respond endogenously following the laws of 
nature (Barrett and Carter, 2010).  Unobservable perceptions about the benefits of a new trade -
related  intervention  will  v ary  among  potential  beneficiaries  in  ways  that  are  likely  to  be 
correlated with other attributes and with the actual effects of the treatment. In section 6, we will 
discuss how randomization may  fail to produce unbiased treatment effects in the presence  of 
―essential‖ heterogeneity or in the presence of spillovers.  
 
4.1.2 Quasi-experimental methods 
When evaluation is not built into program design, RCT is not an option and quasi-experimental 
(QEM)  methods  must  be  used,  all relying on econometric techniques  to  overcome selection 
bias.
29  The first is the difference -in-differences (DID) method briefly described above. By 
comparing differences in outcomes instead of comparing levels, DID controls for unequal 
performance levels of treatment and control groups not relate d to the program. However, DID 
                                                 
27 McKenzie (2011b) discusses the issue of small samples in World Bank private sector support programs in Africa. None of 
those programs has been subject to rigorous impact evaluations so far, but if such evaluations were to be conducted researchers 
would be faced with a serious problem of power given the small number of enterprises assisted by the projects and their large 
degree of heterogeneity. 
28 Randomization across countries would be more difficult to implement than within a country and would not necessarily increase 
the test’s power. 
29 How well quasi-experimental methods perform compared to randomization has been a subject of intense scrutiny since the 
seminal paper of Lalonde (1986), with largely inconclusive results. Glazerman, Levy and Myers (2003) found t hat quasi-
experimental methods produced substantially biased results compared to experimental ones in twelve replication studies of 
welfare and employment programs in the U.S. Cook, Shadish, and Wong (2006) found less clear -cut results for education 
programs. See Ravallion (2008) on the evaluation of poverty programs in non-experimental settings. 21 
 
relies on the assumption of parallel trends and does not control for selection on observables 
(firm-level covariates). 
The DID method can be improved by matching  that controls for observed firm characteristics 
correlated with both program participation and performance. The key assumption for the impact 
estimated by this method to be unbiased is that selection into the program is based only on 
observable firm characteristics.
30 The matching procedure evolves in two steps. First, firm-level 
covariates are used to predict the probability of getting (or enrolling into) the program using a 
probit or logit regression. This predicted probability is called a propensity score. Second, the 
control group is formed by picking, for each treated firm, the untreat ed firms with the closest 
propensity score. For each treated firm, depending on the method, there can be either one 
matched  control  firm  or  several,  using  a  weighted  scheme.
31  Average  outcomes  in  first 
differences are then compared between the treatment group and the matched control group. The 
propensity  score  matching  DID  estimator  allows  for  time -invariant  unobserved  firm 
heterogeneity to affect selection and outcomes. But it does not address the problem that selection 
- as well as outcomes - may depend on unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity, as will be 
discussed below as well as in section 6.3. 
The studies surveyed in Volpe (2011) are good illustrations of the use of quasi -experimental 
methods  in  the  evaluation  of  trade  assistance.  These  studies,  recently  carried  out  at  the 
Integration and Trade Sector of the Inter-American Development Bank, use DID and matching-
DID  methods  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  export  promotion  activities  of 
PROMPEX/PROMPERU  (Peru),  PROCOMER  (Costa  Rica),  URUGUAY  XXI  (Urugu ay), 
PROCHILE (Chile), EXPORTAR (Argentina), and PROEXPORT (Colombia) . They use rich 
and unique datasets for the six Latin American countries that combine firm -level customs data 
with covariates drawn from other national firm -level data sources, and consti tute the first 
rigorous micro-based evidence of the effects of export promotion.
32 The picture emerging from 
Christian Volpe’s survey is that export promotion was effective in facilitating export expansion 
for  firms  in  the  LAC  region,  but  primarily  along  the  extensive  margin.  Firms  exporting 
differentiated  goods  benefit  more  than  those  selling  more  homogeneous  goods.  Small  and 
relatively inexperienced companies benefit more than larger and already established exporters. 
Finally,  bundled  services  that  provide  support  to  firms  throughout  the  export  development 
process appear to be more effective than isolated actions.  
                                                 
30 This assumption is designated as ―ignorable treatment assignment‖ by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which is the seminal 
study on propensity score matching estimation. The assumption means that program participation and outcomes are independent, 
conditional on a set of observed attributes. 
31 The single-match method is called ―nearest-neighbor.‖ Alternatively, one can use n nearest neighbors, or the entire sample of 
untreated firms with weights that decrease with distance from the treated firm’s propensity score. This latter method is called 
―kernel matching.‖ Many other refinements are possible. See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) for details on propensity score 
matching estimators. 
32 An alternative, more traditional route to the evaluation of export-promotion’s effectiveness is the aforementioned cross-country 
study of Lederman et al. (2010). 22 
 
Gourdon, Marchat, Sharma, and Vishwanath (2011) apply the same type of quasi-experimental 
methods to the evaluation of FAMEX, a World Bank-supported export promotion program in 
Tunisia, which provided a mixture of counseling and matching grants to new exporters. The 
study exploits a customized firm-level survey to estimate the effects of FAMEX on the export 
performance  of  beneficiary  firms  at  the  intensive  and  extensive  margins.  Propensity-score 
matching DID estimates suggest a very large and statistically significant growth effect at the 
intensive margin: a 39% differential in terms of annual export growth compared to control firms 
over the 2004-2008 period. The treatment effect at the extensive margin – in terms of products 
and  destinations  –  is  both  smaller  quantitatively  (a  5%  growth  differential  in  the  count  of 
products and destinations for program beneficiaries compared to control firms) and of marginal 
or no significance (at 10% confidence level for destinations and insignificant for products). In 
addition to the observed acceleration in export growth, Gourdon et al. find a significant boost to 
employment growth: a 10% annual differential for program beneficiaries, significant at the 5% 
confidence level. An original feature of their dataset is that it covers service firms in addition to 
manufacturing firms, and they find considerably stronger effects for the former. One potential 
issue with their data is that the survey was conducted ex-post (no baseline survey was conducted 
as IE was not part of the program design) so the data may suffer from recall bias. Preliminary 
results in Cadot, Fernandes, Gourdon, and Mattoo (2011) based on an alternative source of data 
(customs data) suggest a smaller and non-persistent treatment effect. 
Jaud and Cadot (2011) also apply quasi-experimental methods to assess the impact of the E.U.-
funded  pesticides  initiative  program  (PIP)  on  the  export  performance  of  firms  in  Senegal's 
horticulture sector. Their results suggest that, while the program had no significant effect on 
exports of fresh fruit and vegetable pooled over all products and destinations, it had a positive 
effect when considering exports to the EU.  
Other quasi-experimental methods can address selection bias in the evaluation of the impact of a 
program. One approach relies on instrumental variable (IV) estimation. This can be used when 
program take-up is less than complete and thought to be correlated with unobserved individual 
characteristics influencing performance. In this case, eligibility can be used as an instrument for 
participation,  provided  that  eligibility  is  truly  exogenous  (e.g.,  if  there  is  randomization  of 
eligibility but program take-up is incomplete or some participants drop out). This method is used 
in the context of non-targeted interventions by Sequeira (2011), as described in section 4.2.  
Another  approach  is  regression  discontinuity  design  (RDD),  which  makes  use  of  breaks  in 
eligibility  to  identify  a  program’s  impact.
33  For  instance,  suppose  that  an  export  promotion 
program targets small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as defined by a cutoff level of sales. 
If the sample is large enough, one can compare outcomes for SMEs immediately below the 
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cutoff (eligible) and for SMEs immediately above (ineligible), on the assumption that they are 
close enough in the characteristic upon which eligibility is defined to be good matches for each 
other, and most importantly that the cutoff rule is indeed enforced.
34  
4.2 Non-targeted interventions 
Non-targeted  trade  interventions  cover  mostly  programs  that  help  reduce  trade  costs.  These 
include trade facilitation programs such as upgrading of bottleneck infrastructures in ports, roads, 
or  railroads,  reforms  of  customs  agencies  and  procedures,  and  some  types  of  trade 
competitiveness  programs  related  to  general  improvements  in  the  business  environment  or 
support to producer organizations. Because these interventions generally do not target micro 
entities and their direct beneficiaries are multiple and diffuse, the identification of a control 
group is difficult, and so they are less amenable to experimental or quasi-experimental design.  
Considering  "hard"  and  "soft"  infrastructure-related  trade  facilitation  programs,  the  two  key 
constraints to estimating their effects are (a) the endogeneity of program placement and (b) the 
absence  of  well-defined  treatment  and  control  groups.  Thus,  the  pre-treatment  unobservable 
characteristics  that  determine  infrastructure  placement  and  affect  outcomes  will  likely  differ 
between treatment and comparison groups (where groups are, in this case, most likely to be 
locations).  Randomization  in  the  context  of  large  and  sensitive  hard  transport  infrastructure 
programs  is  generally  not  feasible.  This  is  also  the  case  for  soft  trade  facilitation  programs 
relating to  rules,  regulations, and  government agencies dealing  with  the  movement  of cargo 
across borders that are often not amenable to random assignment at the micro-level nor to the 
creation of comparison groups for the purposes of an IE.  
For  interventions  such  as  customs  reform,  the  only  way  to  generate  a  control  group  is  to 
introduce elements of targeting through progressive phase-in during a pilot phase, staggered for 
example across different border posts, or through selective implementation covering only some 
customs offices or officials, or by giving privileged access only to some firms or to some types 
of traded goods. For instance, a "green channel" in customs, which is a speedy clearance for 
trusted operators, can be restricted and randomly allocated in an early phase, using non-eligible 
operators as controls.
35 In this case, methods such as DID can  in principle be applied using the 
locations initially not covered, customs offices or officials, or firms like the control group for the 
targeted entities.  
However, in many cases, during the pilot phase the control group will not be strictly comparable 
to the treatment group. For example, when a border modernization program is initially deployed 
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1998), but may be lesser concern for firm-level trade interventions such as support to SMEs. 
35 This approach is similar to so-called ―pipeline‖ methods where applicants are used as controls for beneficiaries. 24 
 
in one border post, other border posts of different scale and product mixes serving other areas 
could serve as controls. It may then be necessary to use regression analysis to control explicitly 
for the heterogeneity in covariates in estimating differences in outcomes between treated and 
control border posts.  
In some cases, policy design or implementation inadvertently creates the conditions necessary to 
perform  evaluation  through  quasi-experimental  methods  —  what  economists  call  a  ―natural 
experiment.‖ Datt and Yang (2011) exploit one such natural experiment. The government of the 
Philippines used pre-shipment inspection (PSI) services to combat corruption in customs and 
increase import duty collections. The natural experiment arose from two conditions: (1) imports 
from only some origin countries were covered by PSI, which created a natural control group 
(imports from other countries); and (2) in 1990 the government decided to close a loophole 
whereby import transactions below a threshold of $5,000 were exempted from PSI. The loophole 
had enabled traders to slice shipments into small batches and under-invoice them without being 
detected. The customs reform consisted of lowering the threshold to $500, so the period after 
1990 can be considered a ―treatment period.‖ A DID equation can then be used to compare the 
evolution of outcomes before versus after the reform for the treatment and control group of 
countries.  The  DID  estimates  show  that,  when  inspections  were  expanded  to  lower-valued 
shipments, imports shipments were no longer mis-valued, but those from treatment countries 
shifted  differentially  to  an  alternative  duty-avoidance  method  —  shipping  via  duty-exempt 
export processing zones (EPZs). Thus, increased enforcement reduced the targeted method of 
duty avoidance, but led to substantial displacement to an alternative duty-avoidance method. 
Duty collection failed to rise, while importers incurred higher fixed costs as they relocated to 
EPZs. This evidence shows that, to be successful, anti-corruption reforms need to encompass a 
wide range of possible alternative methods of committing illegal activity. 
Sequeira  (2011)  discusses  a  transport  infrastructure  project  consisting  of  investments  in  a 
railroad  connecting  the  economic  heartland  of  South  Africa  to  the  port  of  Maputo  in 
Mozambique. Given the poor state of Mozambique's infrastructure after two decades of war, and 
in face of budget constraints, the government had to be selective in its choice of infrastructure 
investments. They decided to rehabilitate the old-pre-colonial railway in the Maputo transport 
corridor (that would promote regional integration) rather than building an entirely new North-
South connection as was demanded by the Mozambican business class. As the layout of the old-
pre-colonial  railways  had  been  designed  to  serve  19th  century  mining  companies,  there  is 
plausible  exogenous  variation  in  the  emergence  of  the  rehabilitated  railway  relative  to  the 
geography of manufacturing and retail firms at the time of rehabilitation of the railway.  
The IE of this transport infrastructure project estimates the impact of railway rehabilitation on 
firm performance — namely, how it affects transport costs for different firms and sectors, how 
firms respond to these changes, and what are the spillover and network effects across rail and 25 
 
road transport. To identify a causal relationship, the study will use a quasi-experimental method, 
IV, where the treatment, defined as changes in transportation costs, will be instrumented by the 
distance between a firm’s location and a working station of the railroad.  
In addition, the study exploits the fact that other transport corridors in Mozambique developed at 
different speeds and identifies two sets of control firms to match to the treated firms in the 
Maputo transport corridor: firms in the Beira corridor (that have access to a new port but no 
railroad) and firms in the Nacala corridor (that have no access to a new port or railroad). To 
isolate  the  impact  of  the  Maputo  railway  rehabilitation,  the  study  will  use  a  matching  DID 
estimation that assumes that the only factor making the trajectory of these three sets of firms 
different during the sample period is that they were exposed to different transport choice sets. 
The impact of the Maputo railway rehabilitation is not yet known since only the baseline survey 
information is available; a follow-up survey will be conducted in 2011. 
Sequeira (2011) also discusses a "soft" transport infrastructure project focusing on corruption in 
Southern  African  ports.
36  By collecting original data on bribe payments made to customs 
officials and to port operators in the two competing ports of Durban and Maputo, the study is 
able to trace differences in bribe schedules to the organizational structure of each port. By 
observing how firms adapt their shipping and sourcing decisions to the type of corruption faced 
at each port — which enters the calculation of the overall cost of using each port — the study 
estimates the impact of corruption at ports on the behavior of South African firms. The estimates 
show that corruption imposes a distortion in terms of ―diversion‖ — i.e., firms travel on average 
an additional 322 kilometers, more than doubling their transport costs, just to avoid ―coercive‖ 
corruption at a port.  
This effect is only observed for firms facing a higher probability of being coerced into a bribe 
because  of  the  kind  of  product  they  ship.  Firms  are  willing  to  incur  higher  costs  to  avoid 
corruption because of an aversion to the uncertainty surrounding bribe payments at the most 
corrupt port (Maputo). The uncertainty in Maputo seems linked to the short time periods caused 
by high job turnover among customs officials. Firms also respond to different types of corruption 
by  adjusting  their  sourcing  decisions  for  inputs  —  domestically  or  internationally  —  since 
corruption at ports increases the cost of using the port and thus directly affects the relative cost of 
imports.  
While this project is not an impact evaluation of an intervention to reduce corruption in ports, it 
provides two sets of valuable insights on such interventions because it considers the entire chain 
between  competing  port  bureaucracies  setting  bribes  and  user  firms  making  shipping  and 
sourcing  decisions.  First,  the  study  shows  that,  depending  on  the  type  of  corruption  that 
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bureaucrats engage in, bribes can affect the deadweight loss, tariff revenue, and the demand for 
the public service. In particular, corruption seems to reduce significantly demand for the Maputo 
port, stifling the returns to the massive investments in hard infrastructure of the corridor that 
have taken place in recent years. Second, policy changes to the organization of ports and to the 
nature  of  the  interaction  between  shippers  and  port  officials  could  reduce  corruption.  Such 
changes include reducing the discretion of port officials in the clearance process, and eliminating 
face-to-face interactions between clearing agents and port officials. 
Cantens, Raballand, Bilangna, and Djeuwo (2011) describe a recent pilot for customs reform in 
Cameroon that involved the introduction of contracts with performance indicators for frontline 
customs inspectors in two of the country’s customs bureaus (henceforth referred to as treated 
bureaus). The performance indicators covered both trade facilitation and the fight against fraud 
and bad practices. Frontline customs inspectors with good performance would be rewarded with 
non-financial incentives such as congratulatory letters entered into their personnel files, easier 
access  to  the  director  general  of  customs,  training  courses,  and  transfers  to  more  attractive 
bureaus. Poorly performing inspectors would be sanctioned by eviction from bureaus with strong 
―fiscal potential‖ — that is, where the possibilities of earning money legally through disputed 
claims were high.  
 
This project is an interesting example of a trade intervention that in principle is non-targeted, but 
where  targeting  could  have  been  introduced  by  focusing  on  a  sub-set  of  frontline  customs 
inspectors. This could then have been an ideal setting to implement an RCT, whereby a subset of 
randomly chosen frontline inspectors would have been under performance contracts while others 
would not. However, it was not possible to implement an RCT for several reasons. First, the 
seven customs bureaus in Cameroon are specialized (oil imports, special customs regimes related 
to public trends, transit, exports, bulk cargo, and the two treated bureaus) and differ so much in 
customs  practices  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  make  comparisons  across  bureaus.  Hence,  if 
anything, one would need to take a bureau and split it into a treated group and a control group of 
frontline inspectors. But this was not feasible given a small sample problem: less than 10 staff 
work in each bureau. Second, as is generally the case in projects funded by governments or 
international donors, the time for the pilot project was limited. Thus, it was not possible to 
overcome the small sample issue by allowing for turnover within each bureau to artificially 
increase the number of treated and control officers. Moreover, since contract incentives were not 
financial, time was required to reward good performers (e.g., it would not have been feasible to 
appoint high-performing inspectors to better positions every six months).  
Therefore, the IE of the customs performance contracts project was conducted as a comparison 
of inspectors’ behavior before and after the project was implemented, without a defined control 
group, although the impact on clearance times was assessed using the bulk-cargo import bureau 27 
 
as  a  counterfactual.  The  estimated  effects  of  the  pilot  performance  contracts  were  positive 
surprisingly soon after the pilot was launched in mid 2009. Duties and taxes assessed increased 
despite a fall in the number of imported containers (likely linked to the financial crisis), and the 
tax yield of the declarations also rose. The performance contracts also affected clearance times, 
as the share of declarations treated within 24 hours increased more in the treated bureaus than in 
the  counterfactual  bureau,  and  the  variance  of  clearance  times  decreased  dramatically.  The 
impact  on  disputed  claims  was  equally  interesting,  with  inspectors  abandoning  low-level 
disputed  claims  to  focus  on  major  ones,  and  the  ratio  of  taxes  adjusted  to  taxes  assessed 
increased.  Finally,  the  contracts  also  had  a  major  impact  in  reducing  costly  practices.  For 
instance, the number of litigious re-routings from the yellow channel (documents control) to the 
red channel (physical inspection) declined tremendously.  
5. Data issues 
In  this  section,  we  discuss  first,  how  the  objectives  of  the  evaluation  influence  the  type  of 
performance measures that need to be considered, and then how the necessary data may be 
obtained. 
5.1 What should we measure? 
The choice of performance measures is important not only to  ensure that IE focuses on the 
appropriate indicators, but also because using IE can affect the incentives of agents and program 
managers  in  unintended  ways.  Performance  indicators  that  strongly  relate  to  targeted 
interventions in a causal sense are often too technical to be of interest from a broad policy 
perspective;  whereas,  the  highly  aggregate  indicators  that  interest  policy-makers  are  rarely 
faithful  reflections  of  the  effect  of  targeted  interventions  and  projects.  Thus,  selecting 
performance indicators involves a trade-off between breadth and identification.  
Much of the talk in aid-for-trade evaluation focuses on aggregate indicators such as national 
export  performance  or  other  macro  variables.  Although  policy-makers  may  find  these  broad 
indicators  relevant,  the  causal  link  between  them  and  the  actual  performance  of  trade 
interventions is tenuous, implying weak identification.  
By contrast, M&E frameworks, developed to ensure project management and quality control, 
have used intermediate outcomes more directly linked to the projects themselves, like customs 
clearance times. In a causal sense, these measures are closer to project management but are likely 
to be narrow in scope. Deciding which approach is better depends on what the indicators are 
used  for.  If  evaluation  results  are  expected  to  feed  into  incentive  structures  for  program 
managers, identification is critical and breadth is secondary. In contrast, in order to catch the 
attention of policy-makers, breadth matters more, possibly at the cost of weaker identification.  28 
 
Impact evaluation does not escape this general trade-off between breadth and identification, but 
typically locates at the ―narrow‖ end of the spectrum since it identifies changes in performance 
measures that are directly attributable to the project. For instance, when evaluating a customs 
modernization program, the performance measure is likely to be something like container dwell 
time,  even  though  less  quantifiable  dimensions  of  customs  performance,  like  security  at the 
borders, may also matter.  
But identifying and documenting the chain of causality from program to ultimate outcomes can 
be challenging for some trade interventions. In trade facilitation programs, it is not always clear 
what are the micro-level mechanisms by which transport costs reductions influence firms and 
households and, more generally, economic activity. 
In addition, the use of IE can affect incentives in the long run. The focus on narrow, immediate 
performance outcomes may well lead to measurement biases or, even worse, create perverse 
incentives when used for monitoring and evaluation. For one thing, it can focus attention on 
readily measured outcomes at the expense of less easily measured ones. Consider a customs 
modernization program. Using IE results to design reward schemes for customs officials might 
lead to over-emphasis on easy-to-measure reductions in clearance times, at the expense of the 
monitoring of suspect shipments. If, say, there is a low rate of smuggling illicit products, it may 
take time before the consequences of reduced monitoring get noticed — too long to show up in 
an IE. 
5.2 How do we obtain the data? 
The feasibility of rigorous impact evaluation hinges critically on data availability. Whether the 
IE is based on experimental (RCTs) or quasi-experimental design, it needs to include a baseline 
survey and at least one follow-up survey. If quasi-experimental methods are used, the baseline 
survey must include a rich set of covariates to estimate a (first-stage) selection regression. One of 
the advantages of RCTs, especially in developing countries, is that they are less demanding in 
terms of data; however, even with randomization, firm-level covariates can be useful in verifying 
that the treatment and control groups are comparable in their observable characteristics. This is 
especially important for small samples. The availability of a rich set of covariates allows for the 
analysis of heterogeneity in the effects of the program. Moreover, a deep knowledge of the 
objectives of the program as well as its administrative and institutional details can be important 
for the design of surveys that collect the right type of information to control for the selection 
process (Ravallion, 2008).
37  
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Table 3 provides examples of intermediate and ultimate outcomes in the context of new-style 
trade interventions linked to trade competitiveness and trade facilitation.  
Table 3  
 Intermediate and ultimate performance outcomes 
 
The  evaluations  of  the  impact  of  trade  facilitation  programs  —  especially  those  related  to 
infrastructure — suffer currently from a serious lack of micro-data on transport costs and prices 
before  and  after  interventions  take  place.  For  these  types  of  interventions,  it  is  desirable  to 
conduct baseline and follow-up surveys of program beneficiaries and control groups.  
In addition, baseline and follow-up surveys may not be enough to assess a program’s impact. 
Consider, for example, the case of a one-year export-promotion program, where firms can enlist 
in any year between 2005 and 2009; and then suppose that a baseline survey is conducted in 
2004 and a follow-up survey is conducted in 2010. For firms that enrolled in 2005, the follow-up 
survey will pick up outcomes four years after the treatment. By then, if the effects are transient, 
they may have vanished, and the follow-up survey will pick up heterogeneous effects (one year 
after treatment for firms enrolled in 2009, two years for those enrolled in 2008, and so on). Thus, 
although costly, it may be necessary to run repeated follow-up surveys year after year.
38 
While projects typically have budgets for baseline data collection, th ese may not always be 
enough to gather the data  needed for a proper IE evaluation after the project is completed. An 
alternative cost-efficient method is to use official pre-existing sources of data provided that they 
are collected often enough and provided that they can be closely reconciled with program data. 
For example, in the IE of an export promotion program, customs records at the transaction/firm 
level can be used to measure outcomes such as growth in export value (the intensive margin), 
                                                 
38 McKenzie (2011a) argues that two advantages of having multiple data points for treatment and control groups are (1) the 
possibility  of  studying  the  trajectory  of  program  impacts  and  uncovering  causal  chains  and  (2)  the  collection  of  multiple 
measurements on possibly noisy and weakly auto-correlated outcomes. By averaging outcomes across multiple data points noise 
is eliminated and the power to detect genuine effects of a program increases. 
Trade Competitiveness Trade Facilitation
Example of program: matching grant to 
support firms access export markets 
Example of Program: Customs reform 
Intermediate outcomes to understand the 
chain of causality from program to 
outcomes 
Exports, output, input choices at firm-
level  
Customs or port clearance time and 
costs, incidence of illegal activity 
Ultimate outcomes  
Productivity, wages, employment at firm-
level 
Trade volumes, customs revenue 
collected 
Covariates to use as controls or to 
understand the heterogeneity of effects 
of program
Firm-related industry, location, age, size, 
ownership, workforce details
Firm-related or customs office or 
official-related: location, education, 
age, contract 30 
 
number of products, or number of destinations (the extensive margin).
39 Naturally it is important 
to integrate such data with program data such as from the project monitoring database.  
The trade and integration unit of the World Bank Development Research Group is invo lved in a 
major data collection exercise that may help the IE of trade-related interventions in the next few 
years. As described in Freund and Pierola (2011) , the exercise consists  of the collection and 
compilation of the first ever database on exporter-level customs transaction data across countries 
and over time. Data has been obtained for 20 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America, and negotiations are in progress to obtain data for 25 more countries. The database will 
include statistics on exporters’ characteristics and behavior by country, industry, and destination 
market.  The  purpose  of  the  database  is  to  provide  policymakers,  development  agencies, 
researchers, and the public with a novel source of information to conduct analysis of export 
growth at the micro level and allow for the evaluation of programs and policies affecting that 
growth. 
Data on firm characteristics (covariates), used to control for selection bias, is typically hard to 
obtain. If an industrial survey is available in the country where the trade intervention is taking 
place, it can provide the required variables (e.g., location, age of the firm, education of its head, 
number of employees, foreign ownership). However this requires that customs and industrial 
census  data  be  merged,  which  raises  confidentiality  concerns  and  may  require  active 
collaboration by busy officials in local institutions. When data is not available, an alternative is 
to conduct a ―retrospective survey‖ — although this method may be biased. In its evaluation of 
Tunisia’s export-promotion agency, Gourdon et al. (2011) use a combination of data from a 
survey  and  from  national  sources  (the  customs  agency  and  national  statistics  institute).  Yet 
another  alternative  is  to  include  questions  on  program  participation  and  details  in  ongoing 
surveys. This also requires close collaboration between the evaluator and the local institution 
implementing the survey. 
6. Looking ahead: Challenges facing IE of trade assistance 
In this section, we consider three key challenges that credible IE of trade interventions must 
address. 
6.1 External validity and cost 
One concern with impact evaluations is that their external validity is an act of faith. When a 
program is found to be effective (or ineffective), how do we know that the result would carry 
over to similar programs run in different environments?  
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As Rodrik (2008) and Ravallion (2008) have argued, there is a trade-off in policy evaluation 
between  external  and  internal  validity.  As traditional identification  of  causal effects  through 
instrumental-variable  strategies  never  completely  eliminates  confounding  influences,  these 
strategies  always  suffer  from  an  internal-validity  problem.  However,  when  based  on  cross-
country evidence, they pick up average effects that can be relatively stable — provided they are 
consistent with some sort of theory — because induction, even on cross-country samples, may 
fail to produce generalized results.  
By contrast, IE purges out confounding influences, but generates results that are empirical and 
case-dependent. Such results may fail to carry over to different settings. Limited external validity 
of any study would not be a problem if we could replicate it easily. With enough replications, the 
sheer mass of evidence would provide the desired generality (although the method would still be 
inductive and would thus suffer from the general critique of inductive methods in science). But 
some kinds of IE can be costly. For instance, the World Bank reckons that household surveys 
cost on average $300 per household. At that rate, a baseline and final survey of 500 households 
would cost $300,000. This is a lot for studies with only internal validity.
40 However, costs can 
often be contained by working with local institutions, which has the added advantage of building 
capacity in a key area. 
Some trade-related programs target limited numbers of fir ms, so their evaluation is less costly 
than that of poverty-reduction programs. For instance, in a middle -income country, the cost of 
surveying 500 firms can be substantially lower than $100 ,000. Moreover, the data  may exist 
prior to and independently of t he IE in the form of census or industrial surveys and customs 
records. In that case, the cost of the IE goes down dramatically. The problem then is no longer 
one of cost but more of securing buy-in from the agencies possessing the data so that they share 
it. However, it should also be kept in mind that  tests of the effect of interventions based on 500 
firms are likely to have low power (see McKenzie 2011a and 2011b for a discussion), and thus to 
generate type-II errors (failing to reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect when, in fact, 
the effect is present).  If cost-cutting leads, through  low -power experiments, to  unjustified 
pessimism on the effect of interventions, IE may lose a lot of its power to guide policy choices.  
6.2 Spillovers and general equilibrium effects 
                                                 
40 In their discussion of quasi-experimental versus experimental methods, Duflo et al. (2008) make a noteworthy point about the 
commitment value of costly experimental design. It has often been argued, with some statistical support (see, e.g., Ashenfelter, 
Harmon,  and  Ooster-beek  1999),  that  statistically  significant  results  (positive  impact  in  our  setting)  are  more  likely  to  get 
published, a so-called ―publication bias.‖ As experimental methods are costly and usually planned with donors, self-censure in 
the face of insignificant results is less likely to be feasible than when relatively low-cost quasi-experimental methods are used 
with publicly available data. In that sense, IEs may be less affected by publication bias. 32 
 
Externalities can bias treatment effects by blurring or magnifying the difference in outcomes 
between treatment and control groups. In the context of policy evaluation, this raises a deep 
issue, as externalities are often the basic justification for government intervention. 
One key assumption of both experimental and quasi-experimental methods is that the impact of 
the program can be located only among its direct participants, that is, the control group is not 
―polluted‖ by the treatment group, lest the comparison of outcomes be biased. A classic case in 
economics  occurs  when  general  equilibrium  effects  transmit  the  benefits  conferred  on 
beneficiaries  to  non-beneficiaries  or,  alternatively,  penalize  them,  say,  through  rising  input 
prices. For example, a program to upgrade one border post may induce traffic shifting from 
other, untreated border posts. The volume of trade going through the treated border post will then 
be  increased by the substitution from traffic that  normally  goes  through other  posts, and  as 
―control‖ border posts see their traffic go down, using them as controls will result in an upward 
bias  in  the  estimated  treatment  effect  of  the  program.  Similarly,  beneficiaries  of  an  export 
promotion program may be able to lure away the ablest workers from other non-beneficiary 
firms.  The adverse effects on the latter would lead to an overestimate of the benefits of the 
program for the former.  Thus, ignoring general equilibrium effects can produce misleading 
evaluations of policies and programs (Abbring and Heckman, 2007).
41  
In the evaluation of trade-related programs of limited scale, such as export promotion or trade 
facilitation,  general  equilibrium  effects  through  market  mechanisms  may  not  be  critical. 
However, spillovers may be present through other channels – such as social interactions, which 
are direct externalities in which the actions of one agent directly affect the actions (preferences, 
constraints, technology) of other agents (Abbring and Heckman, 2007). For example, an export 
promotion  program  may  have  ―demonstration  effects‖  yielding  valuable  information  on  the 
viability of products or destination markets that can be easily imitated by non-participants. In 
such  circumstances,  the  estimated  treatment  effect  will  be  biased  downward  because  the 
difference in outcomes between the treatment and control groups will measure only the purely 
private effect. It is hardly surprising that treatment effects may be contaminated by information 
externalities. After all, even the most rigorous RCTs used to test the effectiveness of drugs can 
be affected by informational biases, as is the case when individuals in the control group observe 
that they do not suffer a drug’s side-effects while individuals in the treatment group do and as a 
result infer that they received the placebo instead of the treatment. Interestingly, the problems 
originating  in  the  confounding  spillover  effects  from  a  program  to  the  control  group  are  as 
relevant for targeted interventions as they are for non-targeted interventions. In fact, as pointed 
out by Ravallion (2008), they may be a more severe problem for randomized evaluations. 
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In  the  trade  context,  as  in  economics  more  generally, the  presence  of  externalities  takes  on 
special  importance  because  it  plays  a  key  role  in  justifying  government  intervention.  If  the 
benefits of a program whose costs are borne by taxpayers were internalized by the beneficiaries, 
surely those beneficiaries ought  to  pay  for it  and  there  would be  no  justification for public 
intervention. In contrast, if a program generated spillovers so powerful that no treatment effect 
was detectable – that is, the control group indirectly benefited as much from the program as the 
beneficiaries - then there would be a strong argument for a public intervention, as beneficiaries 
would be willing to pay nothing for the treatment.
42  
These arguments suggest that impact evaluation results cannot be properly interpreted without a 
careful  discussion of what market failure (s)  the policies or programs are trying to  remedy. 
Understanding clearly the policy objectives, the relevant constraints (including those related to 
resources, information, incentives, and political economy) and the causal links through which the 
specific  policies  and  programs  yield  expected  outcomes  are  key  for  a ny  good  evaluation 
(Ravallion, 2009). 
If the market failure lies in imperfect capital markets, then a program that provides cheaper-than-
market trade financing to specific firms can be expected to  have a positive treatment effect and 
evidence of such an effect can lead one to conclude that the program works. In this case, if there 
are spillovers, then the positive treatment effect is simply a lower bound of the total effect of the 
program. However, if the market failure is due to informational spillovers, so that private firms 
wait for other private firms to invest in uncovering the information needed to export a particular 
product or  to a particular market, then the absence of a treatment effect  from an export 
promotion program is not evidence that the program is not working. In fact, finding a  positive 
treatment effect could reflect the fact that the benefits are  largely private, in which case the 
rationale for the program is put into question. 
Thus, seeking to justify government-financed programs solely on the basis of treatment effects 
may not only be affected by bias, it may be  altogether wrongheaded. In the export promotion 
program  example, what IE would be measuring is only the private -good dimension of the 
intervention; the public-good dimension would be left unevaluated.  
It is thus important to disentangle whether a no -effect finding is due to externalities or to 
program ineffectiveness. This may call for an independent effort, aside from the  IE itself, to 
detect the presence of externalities. For instance, one might estimate a regression of outcomes of 
untreated individuals on some continuous measure of exposure/closeness to treated individuals, 
to see if more or closer treated neighbors raise the outcome of untreated ones. Alternatively, one 
can include this same measure of exposure to (other) treated individuals in the DID equation and 
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interact it with the treatment to see if the treatment is more powerful on individuals ―surrounded‖ 
(in some economic sense) by other treated individuals. These methods are inspired by measures 
of contagion used in epidemiologic studies.  
In  contrast  with  medical  sciences,  however,  in  social  sciences  the  mechanisms  by  which 
contagion takes place are largely unknown. Baseline surveys as well as qualitative information 
gathered  from  focus  group  discussions  may  help  in  understanding  and  identifying  channels 
through which future program benefits might spread from one firm to another — for example, 
professional association memberships, personal contacts and so on.  
6.3 Heterogeneity  
Differences  among  beneficiaries,  especially  if  they  are  unobserved,  can  pose  particular 
challenges for evaluation. Policy interventions can have diverse impacts across economic agents. 
By focusing on average treatment effects, an evaluation ignores valuable information on the 
heterogeneity of the effects.
43 As Ravallion (2009, p. 37) puts it, practitioners should ―never be 
happy with an evaluation that assumes common (homogeneous) impact‖. He also argues that 
knowing more about the heterogeneity of the effects and the role of contextual factors is key to 
better understand the impact of the intervention and make evaluation more relevant for good 
policy-making. The challenges linked to the heterogeneity of the effects are relevant across types 
of interventions, whether they are of a targeted or a non-targeted nature.  
First, the treatment effects of a program can be related to the observable characteristics of the 
beneficiaries.  For  example  an  export  promotion  program  can  have  differential  effects  for 
participant firms depending on their prior export experience or on their workforce skill levels. If 
the export promotion program consists of a matching grant scheme which co-finances firms’ 
export  business  plan,  the  opportunity  costs  for  participant  firms  may  differ  in  terms  of  the 
alternative uses they could give to their funds.
44 A simple approach to address the heterogeneity 
of the effects when differences are observable is to add interaction effects with the treatment 
dummy variable in a regression framework that estimates the average treatment o n the treated 
effect.  Treatment effects can  also  vary  with  the distribution of outcome s  themselves.  Volpe 
Martincus and Carballo   (2010)  examine the  impacts of export promotion activities   across 
quantiles of the distribution of  Chilean firms’ growth rates of exports using quantile treatment 
effects estimation. They find stronger effects at the lower end of the distribution, which are 
combined with data on firms’ export histories to show that smaller and relatively inexperienced 
firms as measured by their total exports benefit more from export promotion.  
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Second, a particular challenge arises when unobserved differences among beneficiaries influence 
their participation in a program. Even in RCTs where eligibility is randomized, economic agents 
inclined to take up the program based on their unobserved expected net benefits may differ 
systematically from the agents that were part of the sample randomly assigned to the treatment 
group. Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) introduce the notion of ―essential‖ heterogeneity as 
pertaining to the case where the impact of a policy intervention is heterogeneous and agents take 
up treatment based on this heterogeneity (i.e., with knowledge of their idiosyncratic response). 
The  presence  of  ―essential‖  heterogeneity  implies  that  the  estimated  average  effects  of  an 
intervention, even under an RCT, can be biased. For instance, unobservable characteristics of 
firms that determine their choice of applying to an export promotion matching grant scheme (as 
well as their choice of the type of business plan and amount of co-finance to provide) could 
influence the firms’ export success and thus the true effect of the program. The econometric 
approaches  to  address  ―essential‖  heterogeneity  problems  are  at  the  frontier  of  the  impact 
evaluation research (see Manski, 1997; Abbring and Heckman, 2007; Djebbari and Smith, 2008; 
Fan and Park, 2010). 
There are at least two approaches to mitigate the problem of selective take-up on the basis of 
unobservable attributes. Consider again the export promotion scheme example. First, all firms 
could be invited to participate in the program, some firms would officially apply, but then only a 
randomly selected subset of the applicants would actually receive the assistance. The potential 
downside of this approach is limited external validity in the sense that the estimated treatment 
effect will apply only to the self-selected group of applicants – unless, of course, that is the 
impact of interest to the evaluators and policy-makers (McKenzie, 2010).  
Alternatively, the treatment itself could be defined in a way that is de facto compulsory so the 
question of selective take-up does not arise. Thus, a randomly selected set of firms would receive 
some form of ―encouragement,‖ for example through phone calls or visits aimed at providing 
detailed information on the application process, raising the probability that those firms apply to 
the program.
45 The unbiased effect of this random encouragement - the ―intention-to-treat‖ effect 
- would be estimated by comparing take-up by firms that received encouragement relative to 
take-up by firms that did not. To obtain the effect of the program on ultimate outcomes (e.g., 
export  performance)  one  would  instrument  for  treatment  using  the  randomly  provided 
encouragement.  A  limitation  of  this  approach  is  that  in  the  presence  of  ―essential‖ 
heterogeneity‖,  out  of  the  set  of  firms  receiving  the  encouragement,  those  that  take  up  the 
program are likely to have higher unobserved expected benefits from the program than those that 
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do not. Hence encouragement design could be associated with biased treatment effects, which 
are potentially over-estimated relative to the average effects for the sample that would have taken 
up treatment in the absence of encouragement (Barrett and Carter, 2010; Mckenzie, 2010).  
7. Conclusion  
In spite of the challenges, rising demands for results and accountability from donors and clients 
alike require that aid-for-trade evaluation strategies need more ambition and rigor. Implementing 
agencies should no longer be content with traditional methods based on output monitoring and 
before-after  comparisons.  Output  monitoring  is  largely  introspective,  relying  on  measures 
defined by the task managers and therefore liable to biases, while before-after comparisons are 
vulnerable to confounding influences.  
The basic problem faced in the evaluation of a policy, program or project impact is attribution.  
Are  the  observed  changes  in  the  performance  of  treated  entities  really  attributable  to  the 
intervention under consideration, or do they reflect a fortuitous combination of effects? Impact-
evaluation (IE) methods — developed outside of the social sciences but widely adopted in the 
evaluation of poverty, health and education programs — provide a generally accepted answer to 
the problem of attribution.  
Trade interventions have so far escaped the rising tide of evaluation methods. But there is no 
justification for this trade exceptionalism as IE techniques are many and sufficiently flexible for 
use  even  in  the  case  of  interventions  that  are  not  targeted  at  a  defined  group  of  treated 
individuals. 
As the authors have experienced in their campaign for greater recourse to IE techniques in trade, 
the key barriers to progress are not conceptual. Rather, they concern incentive issues, as IEs are 
costly, burdensome, lengthy, and not necessarily aligned with project managers’ incentives. For 
example, World Bank projects to assist private sector firms in Africa last on average five years, 
which would imply that, if their IE involved an RCT, many years would need to elapse for the 
projects to show results (McKenzie, 2011a). These many years would go well beyond a project 
manager’s horizon.  
In principle, researchers need not wait until completion of the project to evaluate its effects; 
rather, results one or two years after the project could be assessed and be used to guide the 
implementation of the project in the subsequent years. While early feedback from an IE is useful, 
is useful it should however be treated with caution. First, it may simply be premature in that the 
effects  of  the  program  may  not  be  adequately  manifested.  Second,  from  a  methodological 
perspective, fine-tuning a program at an intermediate stage could jeopardize the possibility of 
evaluating its effects credibly. 37 
 
The weakness of current evaluation practice can be illustrated no better than by this critical 
assessment, found in the Implementation Completion Report of a recent World Bank project in 
the area of export promotion: 
Although the design of the M&E system was appropriate, both Bank and Government 
project teams had difficulty measuring the achievements of the project using the broad 
indicators  cited  in  the  PAD.
46  [B]y  current  standards,  they  were  insufficient  and 
incomplete.  
[…] M&E, particularly important as a learning objective, was weak. It was slow to start 
and did not deliver. The M&E staff […] lacked the capacity and experience to carry out 
the  monitoring  activities,  and  the Unit  was  unable  to  carry  out  baseline  and impact 
surveys of randomly selected farmers in both project and non-project areas, i.e., survey 
to gauge key interest groups’ response to the outputs generated by the pilot activities. 
The  M&E  Unit’s  ability  to  collaborate  with  other  implementing  agencies  to  collect 
information  and  data  was  also  ineffective.  Implementing partners  did  not  regard  the 
M&E exercise as a learning process but instead, conducted their promotion activities 
without consulting or collaborating with the M&E unit.  
As the reviewers noted, the learning function of evaluation tends to be overshadowed by the 
―monitoring‖ function for implementing agencies.  
In  order  to  overcome  these  hurdles,  several  avenues  must  be  considered.  First,  the  burden 
imposed on project managers should be relieved by making impact evaluation a separate exercise 
carried out by specialists, albeit in collaboration with project managers. Project managers should 
be involved at the right time — that is, during project design and from then on, as much as 
possible, left in peace. The World Bank has moved in this direction through the creation of the 
DIME unit, which provides expertise and help with IE financing. 
At the same time, governments in the countries receiving trade assistance must buy into the 
process. This means sharing knowledge and building capacities for a proper interpretation of IE 
results and, over the long run, for governments to build their own IE capabilities as part of 
public-services delivery improvements.  
Also, every effort should be made to reduce the cost of IEs. For small-scale activities, the cost of 
an IE can be as great as that of the activity itself. This is excessive.  Local resources — in 
particular universities and graduate students — should be involved, producing a double benefit: 
costs are reduced and local capacities are strengthened. 
Finally, the exploitation of IE results should prioritize learning over monitoring. That is, donors 
and  implementing  agencies  should  tread  cautiously  in  using  IE  results  to  frame  incentive 
systems. Care is needed in the interpretation of IE results because premature conclusions could 
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easily provoke a backlash and because a considerable accumulation of evidence is needed to 
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